Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 43

Issue 3

Article 11

1955

Negligence Claims Between Parent and Child
Carl W. Turner
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Turner, Carl W. (1955) "Negligence Claims Between Parent and Child," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 43: Iss.
3, Article 11.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol43/iss3/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Recent Cases
NEGLIGENCE CL.ims BETWEEN PAENT Am

CamL-Two recent de-

cisions have committed Kentucky to the general rule that prohibits
tort actions based on negligence between parents and their minor
children. In one, a woman sued her seventeen year old son for injuries
sustained by reason of the alleged negligent operation of an automobile. The plaintiff sought to establish the emancipation of the child,
tacitly conceding the immunity of the child if not emancipated. The
evidence was insufficient to show emancipation, which would have
brought the case within an acknowledged exception to the general
rule,' and the Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict of the
trial court for the defendant. Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W. 2d
667 (Ky. 1954).
The converse of this problem was an action by the personal representative of a deceased child against the child's father for wrongful
death caused by the alleged negligent operation of the defendant's
family purpose automobile by the defendant's minor son. According
to the court's view of the constitutional 2 and statutory3 provisions for
wrongful death claims, the problem presented was whether or not
an unemancipated minor could maintain an action of negligence
against its parent.4 The court held that the action could not be maintained, stating: 'Weare of the opinion that a general public policy,
in the absence of legislation changing it, justifies denial of the right
of a minor child to sue its parent for such a tort." Harralsonv. Thomas,
269 S.W. 2d 276, 277 (Ky. 1954).
The Thompson case presented the parent against minor child problem to the Kentucky Court of Appeals for the first time. The situation
in the Harralsoncase had been before the Court once before in Hale
v. Hale,5 and in the latter case the representative of the child's estate
was permitted to recover from the child's parent. The opinion in the
Harralsoncase acknowledged the result reached by Hale v. Hale, but
treated the controversy in the Harralsoncase as one of first impression

saying that the issue of child against parent was not discussed or
decided in that opinion. This seems to be a questionable conclusion
in view of the language of the court in the Hale case.6
I PROSSER, TORTS 907 (1941).
'Ky. CONST. sec. 241.
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 411.130 (1953).
'It is not within the scope of this writing to discuss the view of the court with

respect to the wrongful death provision.
'312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W. 2d 610 (1950); Note, 39 Ky. L.J. 479. (1951).
6Id. at 869, 230
S.W. 2d at 612: "It is urged here by appellee that the common law disability of one spouse to sue the other, or of a parent to sue a child, or
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Speaking only of negligence actions between parent and child, the
principal cases are undoubtedly in accord with the general rule in the
United States.7 The origin of the doctrine in this country has been
traced to an obscure Mississippi case; 8 unquestioned acceptance by
other courts would be difficult to explain. The reasons given by the
courts for denying recovery by a child against its parent are for the
most part the same as those given when the converse situation is
before the court." If a jurisdiction decides that the parent is immune
from suit by his minor child then it will ordinarily follow that the
child is immune from suit by the parent, since the courts usually
make no efforts to distinguish the situations.
A variety of reasons are given in support of the rule.10 Some appear
vice versa, for tort should be applied." The court then quotes from Robinson's
Adm'r v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S.W. 1075 (1920), which held that the
administrator of a deceased wife could maintain an action against her husband
for the wrongful death of the wife at the hands of the husband where the wife
was survived by children in addition to the husband: "It is expressly provided by
the Constitution that the action may be maintained in every such case by the
administator of the decedent, and for the benefit of those named in the statute.
Manifestly no rule of the common law nor any limitations found in the married
woman s act enacted in the exercise of a general legislative authority can possibly have the effect of defeating or abridging such an explicit and mandatory
provision of the Constitution and a legislative enactment in compliance therewith."
The court in the Hale case then continued: "The reasoning therein is equally
applicable to the case of Carol Lynn Hale [the deceased minor child] where an administrator of a deceased child sues for wrongful death ......
'Parent against child: Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A. 2d 765 (1942);
Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E. 2d 766 (1940); Rines v. Rines, 97
N.H. 55, 80 A. 2d 497 (1951); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Sup. 383, 57 A. 2d
426 (1948); Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A. 2d 205 (1941). Child
against parent: Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938); Luster
v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E. 2d 438 (1938); Baker v. Baker, 263 S.W. 2d
29 (Mo. 1953); Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A. 2d 563 (N.H. 1954); Cannon v.
Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E. 2d 236 (1942); Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C.
638, 70 S.E. 2d 676 (1952); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.
2d 37 (1952); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E. 2d 170 (1953); Ball
v. Ball, 269 P. 2d 302 (Wyo. 1954); Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1948).
'Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The defendants
minor daughter sought damages for false imprisonment. The court decided that
the action could not be maintained saying: "The state, through its criminal
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental viole'nce and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand." The Mississippi Court
did not cite authority for the position that it took in this case. McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. (3 Cates) 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) is the next case on the
subject of a minor child suing a parent for a tort. Holding for the defendant the
court cites the Hewellette case and refers to the immunity of the parent as a common law rule. It is doubtful that there was such a common law rule: see Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 906 (1930). POLLOCxc, LAW oF ToRTs 150
(New American-From Third English Edition 1894), in speaking of the authority
of parents to administer summary punishment says: "And such persons are protected in exercise thereof, if they act in good faith and in a reasonable and
moderate manner." There is no indication from this passage of a common law
rule of immunity of a parent from suit for tort by an injured child.
'Rines v. uines, supra note 7, 80 A. 2d at 498; Silverstein v. Kastner, supra
note 7; Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. (5 Beeler) 553, 89 S.W. 2d 751 (1936).
" See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 H~Av. L.
REV. 1030 (1930).
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contradictory," and only a few merit comment. They are: (1) The
rule is based on a sound public policy that seeks to preserve domestic
tranquility;12 (2) Such suits tend to undermine parental authority and
discipline;13 (3) There is an analogy to suits between husband and
wife; 14 (4) A parent, since he is charged with the protection of the
child's interests, cannot occupy this protective position and that of
claimant against the child at the same time.15
The argument that tort actions between parent and child should
be prohibited in order to preserve domestic peace and tranquility is
the one most often stated. If the peace of the home has not been disturbed before the action is brought, it is unlikely that it wiU be shattered by a lawsuit.16 When the defendant is.protected by liability insurance, it could seldom be argued that to permit the claim would
result in the destruction of family peace. The best answer to this
argument is found in the decisions of the courts themselves in permitting the enforcement of property rights between parent and child.'7
If the family tranquility argument is not sufficient where property
rights are involved, it should not stand in the way where the claim relates to personal injuries.

Probably the most valid reason given in support of the rule against
a suit by a child is that the action may undermine parental control and
discipline. But an action to redress an injury resulting from an act
not involving parental control can hardly be said to be an undermining
factor where the act complained of was not one committed while in
the exercise of such control. Furthermore, there should be no reluctance to distinguish among claims based on different types of wrongful conduct by the parent in the exercise of parental control. It has
been said that there is no practical line of demarcation which may
be drawn between actions based on heinous crimes and actions for
any other tort.'8 This is not a convincing argument when it is rememIt is said that claims between members of a family will disrupt domestic
tranquility, and that there would be danger of fraud. It seems doubtful that a
claim which is fraudulent because of collusion between the members of the family
would also be disruptive of domestic tranquility.
' Hewellette v. George, supra note 8, 90 So. at 887; Silverstein v. Kastner,
supra note 7; Shaker v. Shaker, supra note 7, 29 A. 2d at 767.
. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 181, 181 A. 198, 199 (1925); Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
'Roller v. Roller, 87 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Prosser, op. cit. supra
note 1 at 906.
u Shaker v. Shaker, supra note 7, 29 A. 2d at 767; Schneider v. Schneider,
160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 499 (1980).
See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149, 158 (1952).
O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 805 Ky. 60, 202 S.W. 2d 999 (1947); McCurdy,
supra note 10, at 1057.
'i Roller v. Roller, supra note 14, 79 P. at 789. (An extreme case denying the
claim of a child who was raped by her father.)
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bered that courts must make fine distinctions every day. In the reverse
situation, a suit by a parent agaiiist the child seems even less likely to
undermine parental authority.
The analogy to the immunity of a husband or a wife from suit by
the other is invalid to the extent that there is no conception of legal
identity between a parent and minor child. 19 There is, however,
similarity between the two situations to the extent that the courts give
the same reasons for denial of a claim between husband and wife that
are given in claims between parent and child. Courts in the parent
against child cases, as well as in controversies between husband and
wife, have asserted that the claims should be denied in order to preserve domestic peace and tranquility. For example, the Court of Appeals in Broaddusv. Wilkenson2 stated as dictum that actions between
husband and wife could not be maintained since they were against a
public policy which sought to preserve domestic peace and felicity.
In the principal case of Harralson v. Thomas the court said that it was
unwilling to abandon the principles supporting the general rule. It
may be assumed that one of the principles referred to was the interest
of society in preserving domestic tranquility.
It is very interesting to note that the Kentucky court has recently
permitted a wife to maintain a tort action against her husband. 21 The
opinion in the Harralson case attributed the result reached in the
action between husband and wife to the Married Woman's Property
Act.22 It is believed that the statute affords a slim basis for distinguishing the cases. If the passage of the Married Woman's Property Act
indicated that the public policy argument supporting the rule in the
husband and wife cases should be disregarded, a similar result should
be reached in cases involving parent and child.
The argument that it is inconsistent for the parent to occupy the
position of protector of his child's interest and be a claimant against
him seems to be the only attempt to distinguish the claim by a parent
against his child from that of the child against its parent. This is another reason evidently deemed insufficient in claims involving property. The question should be asked: Why is. it applicable in one case
and not the other? No answer is apparent.
Dissatisfied courts have found at least three ways to evade the
general rule. The cases may be classified as follows: (1) Cases where
the acts of the defendant were said to constitute wilful misconduct or
",McCurdy, supra note 10, at 1074.
281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W. 2d 1952 (1940).
'Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W. 2d 480 (Ky. 1953); 42 Ky. L.J. 497 (1954).
-Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 404.020 (1953).
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wantonness; 23 (2) Several cases which have allowed recovery where
the defendant was engaged in his vocational capacity; 24 (3) At least
one case where the court has relied on a master and servant relationship between father and son plus the presence of workmen's compensation insurance.2 5
The common factor in cases where recovery has been permitted is
liability insurance. Apparently the presence of liability insurance without one of the additional factors listed has never been sufficient to
abrogate the general rule, although the language of at least two courts,
New Hampshire and West Virginia, seemed strong enough to indicate
that liability could be premised on insurance alone.20 However, a
subsequent decision by the New Hampshire court adhered to the general rule in a case involving the negligent operation of an automobile
by an insured parent. 27 A similar case has not come before the West
Virginia court since its previous decision.
The argument that liability insurance should change the general
rule is that its existence, since it relieves the defendant from ultimate
responsibility, will answer the public policy argument because family
harmony will not be disturbed when financial responsibility is placed
on the insurer. In reply the courts have said: (1) The existence of
liability insurance should not create a right of action where none
29
would otherwise exist;28 (2) There would be danger of collusion;
(3) The action might still produce the family disturbance that the general rule seeks to prevent, since most insurance policies recjuire the
cooperation of the insured in the defense of any claim;3 0 (4) Not every
child or parent would be insured, and it would be hardly feasible to
make a rule of public policy depend on the question of whether the
defendant is insured. 31
The first of these arguments is of course true in a narrow sense,
but the essential fact which establishes the liability of the defendant
is that he has provided for satisfaction of the judgment in a manner
which removes the main objection to the maintenance of the claim.
'Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E. 2d 152 (1952); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950).
'Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 348 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). (In both cases the father was the owner of the
bus in which the plaintiff child was riding when injured).
" Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 7 (Son was injured while employed by father,
a contractor and builder).
Id., 150 A. at 915; Lusk v. Lusk, supra note 24, 166 S.E. at 539.
- Levesque v. Levesque, supra note 7.

Shaker v. Shaker, supra note note 7, 29 A. 2d at 767; Villaret v. Villaret,
supranote 7, at 678; Levesque v. Levesque, spra note 7, at 564.
Villaret v. Villaret, supra note 7, at 679.
30Ibid.
's

Shaker v. Shaker, supra note 7, 29 A. 2d at 767.
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Satisfaction of a judgment by a third party simply would not in fact
disturb the peace and harmony of the home. The second and third
reasons are contradictory and an admission of either as a general principle would be to deny the other. The danger of collusion is a common argument used by courts when reasonable arguments are not
available. Cooperation by the insured with the insurer in defense of
a claim assumes what in fact would not be true in that the insured
would not, as a practical matter, begrudge a member of his family
compensation for his injuries. Cooperation need not go that far. In
answer to the fourth argument it is not apparent why liability should
not turn on the presence of insurance if it be decided that the general
rule is the best one in cases where the defendant is not insured. Public
policy is dependent on existing circumstances as well as other reasons
that support rules of law.
Cooley, about sixty six years ago, had this to say about the immunity of parents to tort actions by their children: "In principle there
seems to be no reason why such an action should not be sustained
....,"32 Prosser, speaking of torts in the family, states: "Few topics in
the law of torts, in view of modem economic, social, and legislative
changes, display in their treatment greater inconsistency and more un33
satisfactory reasoning."
In the absence of legal principle are the reasons in support of the
general rule sufficient? The abundance of reasoning which denies the
rule is as great as that which upholds it. The pervasiveness of the
general rule has been sharply diminished by cases which seize on
some factor to escape its harshness. 34 The next logical step would be
to permit an injured child or ,parent to recover for injuries sustained
from the negligent operation of an automobile where the defendant
is insured. It is to be regretted that Kentucky did not lead the way
when the opportunity presented itself to allow suits between parent
and child as it did in a suit between husband and wife. The absence
of a statute to be construed is a slender basis for the distinction.
CARL W. TUmNE
LABoR LAw-ExcLusnE PowER or Ti NLRB AGAnsT PowER OF STATE
COURT To ENjoiN Acnvrry VioLATiNG STATE LAw-The defendant
union called a strike against the American Suppliers, Inc. and placed
picket lines around its establishments. One of the establishments was
a "stemmery" situated on ground owned by the American Tobacco
Coor.=y, LAw o" TORTS 197 (2d ed. 1888).
,' Supra note 1, at 897.
Supra notes 24, 25, and 26.

